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Torgerson’s Twilight: The 
Antidiscrimination Jurisprudence of 
Judge Diana E. Murphy 
David Schraub† 
To be a clerk for Judge Diana Murphy was not just one of 
the great honors of my life as a lawyer.1 It was also one of the 
great joys. Many judges have a reputation for fairness, intelli-
gence, wit, or compassion stemming from their performance on 
the bench—and Judge Murphy well deserved hers. But Judge 
Murphy was rare in that her reputation as a mentor for her 
clerks—the kindness, love, and support she gave to all of us 
while we served and throughout our careers—extended just as 
far. It is a cliché to speak of clerking as “the best job you’ll ever 
have,” but working for Judge Murphy gave life to the adage “it’s 
not a job if you love what you do.” 
Still, every workplace has its unwritten sets of rules, and 
Judge Murphy’s chambers were no different. The first, and by 
far most important, rule of being a Judge Murphy clerk2 was to 
always ensure the chamber was stocked with Tab soda. This can-
not be overstated: running out of Tab was a drop-everything, 
Category-5-hurricane level emergency. Like most humans born 
after 1975, I had no idea before beginning my clerkship that Tab 
soda was still offered for sale, but I quickly learned that Judge’s 
consumption alone was enough to keep at least one production 
line going. One could get a fairly accurate gauge of Judge Mur-
phy’s daily workload based on the number of Tabs she drank: one 
 
†  Lecturer in Law and Senior Research Fellow, California Constitution 
Center, University of California, Berkeley Law School; Law Clerk, the Honora-
ble Diana E. Murphy, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
(2012–13). Copyright © 2018 by David Schraub. 
 1. I respect the advice given by Paul Horwitz in his recent clerkship trib-
ute, but I will not follow it. Paul Horwitz, Clerking for Grown-Ups: A Tribute to 
Judge Ed Carnes, 69 ALA. L. REV. 663 (2018). 
 2. I attempted to popularize the moniker “Murphette” to refer to Judge 
Murphy’s clerks, with limited success. 
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Tab on a standard day, two Tabs on a particularly heavy day, 
and three Tabs . . . well, let’s just say it was fortunate there were 
very few three-Tab days.3 
The second rule of clerking for Judge Murphy was that one 
could only have positive opinions about the building that housed 
the Federal Courthouse in Minneapolis. Judge Murphy was 
Chief Judge of the District of Minnesota at the time the building 
was constructed and had a hand in the choice of architect and 
design.4 This rule had become widely enough known that I was 
aware of it before I even began clerking—it was a piece of advice 
relayed to me in the utmost seriousness to help me prepare for 
my interview. Fortunately for me, I genuinely do like the archi-
tecture of the courthouse building (including the grassy mounds 
out front which serve the dual role of security measure and 
greenery feature), so this one was no trouble to follow. 
The third rule was not to talk about cats. I never did get the 
story behind that one, though it did sometimes require some cre-
ative writing around the subject of “cat’s-paw” discrimination li-
ability.5 
And the fourth and final rule was to avoid, if at all possible, 
citing the case of Torgerson v. City of Rochester.6 
Of all the unwritten rules, this one may well have been the 
strangest—and not just because it was the only one to touch on 
an actual legal case. Torgerson was a 2011 en banc antidiscrim-
ination law decision, the most consequential portion of which 
seems at first blush to be entirely uncontroversial and which 
 
 3. Once, after a doctor advised her to drink less soda, I observed Judge 
Murphy drinking LaCroix Sparkling Water. It was an experiment that lasted 
all of one day. 
 4. For more on Judge Murphy’s role in the construction of the courthouse, 
see Letter from Richard L. Gilyard, Former Architect of the Eighth Circuit of 
the U.S. Courts, to the Minn. Cong. Delegation (June 12, 2018) (on file with the 
Minnesota Law Review). 
 5. A term coined by Judge Posner, “cat’s-paw” liability occurs where a su-
pervisor—not accused of discriminatory animus him or herself—simply serves 
as a conduit for the prejudicial action of someone else in the organization. 
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). A search of Judge Mur-
phy’s opinions on Lexis Advance reveals she never once used the phrase. 
 6. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
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Judge Murphy (along with all of the other judges on the court) 
joined.7 So what about it could possibly provoke such antipathy?8 
Answering that question takes us on a tour of some of Judge 
Murphy’s most important antidiscrimination law opinions. Her 
jurisprudence in this field was marked by a profound and em-
pathic understanding of how deep the wrongs of discrimination 
can cut, even in circumstances where relatively insulated judges 
may have difficulty understanding the gravity of the harm. But 
her opinions stand out particularly for recognizing how these 
claims are often deeply fact-laden, and therefore should not be 
preemptively dismissed on summary judgment by judges over-
confident in their ability to declare what does and does not count 
as actionable discrimination. Resisting judicial trends that seek 
to narrow the boundaries of a viable discrimination claim and 
intrude further and further into the province of juries, Judge 
Murphy pushed for antidiscrimination doctrine to include the 
full breadth of what can plausibly count as unlawful discrimina-
tion. 
I. 
The summary judgment standard in federal court is at this 
point exceedingly familiar: courts should grant summary judg-
ment where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”9 
Summary judgment is not, however, a license for judges to weigh 
evidence or apply their independent judgment to the facts—
those activities remain the sole province of the jury.10 Conse-
quently, a court considering a summary judgment motion must 
“view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
 
 7. The portion that was unanimous, and likely prompted the case to be 
heard en banc in the first place, was the declaration that “[t]here is no ‘discrim-
ination case exception’ to the application of summary judgment . . . .” Id. at 1043 
(citations omitted). This will be discussed at length below. While agreeing that 
the normal rules of summary judgment should apply, Judge Murphy joined four 
other judges in dissenting with respect to their application—namely, whether 
there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the underlying discrim-
ination claims in the case. Id. at 1054 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 8. As it happens, Torgerson actually does mention cat’s-paw discrimina-
tion liability. Id. at 1045 (citing Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 
(2011)). But I do not believe that suffices as the answer. 
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 10. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) 
(“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of 
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”). 
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ing party and draw[] all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.”11 It is only in those cases where no “rational trier 
of fact [could] find for the nonmoving party” that summary judg-
ment can be granted.12 
Prior to Torgerson, a series of Eighth Circuit precedents had 
suggested that discrimination cases may present especially in-
apt candidates for summary judgment.13 As many of these cases 
observed, proof of discrimination often is a matter of inference 
rather than direct evidence, and whether a finding of discrimi-
nation ought to be inferred from a given bit of evidence generally 
represents a question of fact rather than law.14 Hence, as one 
case put it, “summary judgment should be used sparingly in the 
context of employment discrimination and/or retaliation 
cases[,]”15 in order to permit the jury to fulfill its proper role of 
deciding what inferences to draw from potentially ambiguous or 
indirect evidentiary records.16 
The first holding in Torgerson, joined by all of the judges on 
the Eighth Circuit (including Judge Murphy), addressed this 
line of precedent.17 It concluded, in straightforward fashion, that 
“[t]here is no ‘discrimination case exception’ to the application of 
summary judgment, which is a useful pretrial tool to determine 
whether any case, including one alleging discrimination, merits 
a trial.”18 Stated thusly, this conclusion is clearly correct—it 
simply restates the Supreme Court’s oft-reiterated point that 
 
 11. Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d 732, 733 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 12. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 
(1986). 
 13. See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 605 F.3d 584, 593 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(collecting cases), vacated, 643 F.3d at 1053. 
 14. See, e.g., Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 2005), 
abrogated by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1031 (“Summary judgment should seldom 
be granted in employment discrimination cases because intent is often the cen-
tral issue and claims are often based on inference.”); Breeding v. Arthur J. Gal-
lagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156 (8th Cir. 1999), abrogated by Torgerson, 643 
F.3d at 1031 (“Summary judgment seldom should be granted in discrimination 
cases where inferences are often the basis of the claim . . . .”). 
 15. Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1117 (8th Cir. 2006), 
abrogated by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1031. 
 16. See id. at 1118 (“Where reasonable fact finders could extend an infer-
ence in favor of the non-moving party without resorting to speculation, we may 
not declare the inference unjustifiable simply because we might draw a different 
inference.”). 
 17. See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1043. 
 18. Id. 
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courts should not “treat discrimination differently from other ul-
timate questions of fact.”19 Where summary judgment is appro-
priate in a discrimination case—that is, where, after “viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party” the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law—it 
should be granted.20 Where it is not, it should not be.21 Who could 
argue? 
Nobody, one would think. But there remains an open ques-
tion as to whether, in practice, Eighth Circuit discrimination ju-
risprudence has in fact followed this admonition. The summary 
judgment standard, after all, serves a dual role. It allows for 
early disposition of cases where there are no disputed material 
facts and one side is entitled to prevail as a matter of law;22 but 
it also guarantees that in those cases where facts are contested, 
and reasonable inferences could be drawn supporting either side, 
the parties are entitled to a jury trial.23 A “discrimination case 
exception” to the summary judgment rule can exist just as much 
when precedents illicitly strip cases away from juries as it would 
when cases are improperly submitted to them. 
II. 
Many of the key antidiscrimination statutes are admirably 
succinct. Title VII, for example, makes it unlawful for an em-
ployer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”24 Section 1981 is similarly terse in its verbiage: 
 
 19. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) 
(quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993)); St. Mary’s 
Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 524 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)); Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716. 
 20. Putman v. Unity Health Sys., 348 F.3d 732, 733 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 21. See id. 
 22. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 23. See generally id. 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2016). Other federal antidiscrimination stat-
utes use parallel language. For example, the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) renders it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2016). Conse-
quently, as Judge Murphy has noted, Title VII precedents can be used to assist 
in interpreting ADEA cases and vice versa, “since the relevant definitions are 
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it gives all persons “the same right in every State and Territory 
to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens,” including “the making, performance, modification, and 
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, priv-
ileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.”25 
Nonetheless, mighty oaks from little acorns grow, and these rel-
atively simple federal mandates have generated a wealth of doc-
trine and case law interpreting, applying, and extending dis-
crimination jurisprudence across a seemingly endless array of 
fact patterns and social contexts. What unites Judge Murphy’s 
jurisprudence in this arena is an uncompromising demand that 
judges take seriously these diverse facts and contexts, and resist 
the temptation to substitute their own subjective assessments of 
what counts as meaningful discrimination for those of juries. 
Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc. is a good place to begin.26 In Greg-
ory, the Eighth Circuit sat en banc to consider § 1981 discrimi-
nation claims brought by over a dozen Black customers of 
Dillard’s department stores.27 While the precise factual allega-
tions varied, the account of one plaintiff, Crystal Gregory, is il-
lustrative. While shopping at a Dillard’s store, she recounted be-
ing closely followed by a sales associate to the dressing room 
even after she had informed the associate she did not need assis-
tance.28 When she emerged from the dressing room, Gregory en-
countered the associate “guarding the fitting room door with her 
arms crossed and a smirk across her face. Two police officers 
were also waiting just outside the entrance to the fitting 
rooms.”29 After an unsatisfactory discussion with the store man-
ager, Gregory left in disgust without completing her purchase.30 
Gregory also testified that “she could not recall a time when she 
had visited [this] Dillard’s” without being closely trailed, and 
that she had at least once heard an employee “characterize Afri-
can Americans as thieves.”31 
In general, the plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to 
racially motivated surveillance and shadowing that was degrad-
ing, humiliating, and ultimately deterred them from making a 
 
nearly identical and the underlying purpose is similar.” Devine v. Stone, Leyton 
& Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 80 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)–(b) (2016). 
 26. Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 481 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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purchase at the store outright.32 Despite this, the court con-
cluded that none of the plaintiffs’ claims sufficed to reach a jury 
and, over a dissent by Judge Murphy, granted summary judg-
ment to the store.33 
The core legal questions in Gregory were whether the plain-
tiffs had “engage[d] in a protected activity” (that is, had they 
sought to make a contract) and whether they had experienced 
“interference with that activity by the defendant.”34 Judge Mur-
phy’s dissent addressed both of these questions by stressing the 
degree to which the majority sought to transform factual dis-
putes into legal certainties via extraordinarily narrow interpre-
tations of relevant antidiscrimination doctrine.35 Indeed, her 
opening salvo against the majority opinion was to note that “the 
majority largely neglects to discuss the facts of this case until 
the last quarter of its opinion and then seems to sweep them 
aside.”36 
The Supreme Court made clear that § 1981 “protects the 
would-be contractor along with those who already have made 
contracts.”37 The majority in Gregory took a narrow view of this 
mandate, effectively limiting it to when a buyer places an item 
in front of a cashier and offers to pay.38 But, as Judge Murphy 
observed, “[i]t is difficult to generalize about when a shopper’s 
interactions with a merchant ripen into a protected ‘tangible at-
tempt to contract’ because by definition the determination must 
be fact based.”39 “The steps toward contract formation will vary 
by context”40—there is a difference between the amount of inter-
 
 32. Id. 
 33. To be precise, most of the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed for failure to 
state a claim as their complaint had solely alleged that they were “followed and 
surveilled while they were in the store” but had not “attempted to purchase 
merchandise.” Id. at 473–74 (majority opinion). The remainder, where the plain-
tiffs expressly pled that they were planning on making a purchase, were dis-
missed on summary judgment. Id. at 474. 
 34. Id. at 469 (citing Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 483 F.3d 533, 538 (8th Cir. 
2007); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2004)); see Run-
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (asserting that a case where plaintiffs 
“sought to enter into contractual relationships” with the defendant but were 
blocked from doing so represented “a classic violation of § 1981”). 
 35. Gregory, 565 F.3d at 478–97 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 479. 
 37. Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). 
 38. See Gregory, 565 F.3d at 470. 
 39. Id. at 484 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 485. 
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action and give-and-take between customer and staff that typi-
cally precedes purchasing a pack of gum versus purchasing du-
rable home goods. 
In the specific context of department store shopping, it is incontrovert-
ible that customers will often want to inspect garments for quality and 
fit or sample fragrances for scent before concluding a purchase. Modern 
retailers such as Dillard’s place much of their merchandise on open dis-
play, inviting browsers to examine, sample, and inspect their goods, all 
with an eye towards generating sales. The atmosphere and ambience 
of a high end retail store are part of its overall allure and contribute 
both to the shopping experience and the customer’s willingness to con-
sider goods for purchase. When a shopper in good faith takes advantage 
of these opportunities, she is surely protected by § 1981. It would be 
remarkable indeed to conclude otherwise and to permit a merchant out 
of pure racial animus to deny African American customers access to 
fitting rooms so long as it allowed such customers to purchase outfits 
straight from the rack.41 
 Similar problems plagued the majority’s interpretation of 
“interference.”42 At the summary judgment stage, Dillard’s con-
ceded that the plaintiffs had provided evidence of intentionally 
discriminatory actions targeting Black shoppers.43 But the ma-
jority nonetheless concluded that certain forms of intentional 
discrimination were permitted under the Act in cases where they 
did not “actually interfere” with the customer’s ability to con-
tract.44 Racially discriminatory surveillance and shadowing, it 
argued, do not represent an “interference” with the making and 
enforcement of a contract.45 It is instead the sort of conduct that 
the reasonable customer would shrug off; it would not “‘block’ or 
‘thwart’ the creation of a contractual relationship.”46 But this is 
the epitome of a factually laden question. Did the behavior of 
Dillard’s employees towards Gregory—shadowing her when she 
went to fitting rooms, smirking at her when she left the dressing 
room while having police officers waiting for her outside, direct-
 
 41. Id. 
 42. See generally id. at 469–76 (majority opinion). 
 43. Id. at 469. 
 44. Id. at 471 (quoting Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 358–59 (5th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 45. Id. at 476 (“As noted, several courts have concluded that not all offen-
sive conduct of a merchant constitutes actionable interference.”). 
 46. Id. (“To recognize a § 1981 claim on the facts in this case, we believe, 
would dilute the requirement that a defendant ‘block’ or ‘thwart’ the creation of 
a contractual relationship.”) (citations omitted). 
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ing racist remarks towards her, all done on a consistent and reg-
ular basis each and every time she visited the store47—“inter-
fere” with her desire to contract a sale at Dillard’s? One suspects 
that different observers would answer that question differently. 
Some might find that Gregory was too sensitive; they would im-
agine that were they in her shoes they would simply ignore the 
hostile store workers and complete the purchase. Others might 
be more empathic with her decision, deciding that many persons 
would find it intolerable to continue shopping under those con-
ditions and that they therefore pose a tangible and nontrivial 
barrier to Black persons’ ability to contract as equals in the 
store.48 
Our legal system does not conclusively decide which answer 
to that question is right, particularly given how nested it is in-
side the very particular facts that the plaintiffs testified to. Ra-
ther, the core function of a jury trial is to ensure that the ulti-
mate answer—whatever it is—is provided by a body drawn from 
a diverse cross section of the community instead of the rather 
rarefied and insulated panel of federal court judges.49 But the 
majority in Gregory flipped this concern on its head: it suggested 
that an expansive, context-laden interpretation of “interfering” 
with a contract would mean that “virtually any case in which 
there is a disputed issue regarding the merchant’s [racist] moti-
vation would be submitted to a jury” (an outcome it clearly 
viewed as intolerable, though it is unclear why).50 
 
 47. Id. at 481 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 48. Id. at 492 (“A reasonable jury could certainly conclude from Gregory’s 
evidence that the behavior exhibited by [a Dillard’s employee] was hostile and 
intimidating. Dillard’s may argue that a more patient shopper would have en-
dured this treatment and persisted in making a purchase in spite of it. The 
proper forum for questions of fact, however, is at trial and not here on review of 
a motion for summary judgment.”). 
 49. See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S 
COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 20–21 (2017) (“Federal judges are 
appointed by the President of the United States and have elite backgrounds and 
credentials. . . . Juries, on the other hand, include more of a mix of the popula-
tion, with, for example, more income levels, women, and people of different races 
and religions.”). 
 50. Gregory, 565 F.3d at 472. 
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The upshot of the court’s decision in Gregory is to establish 
as a matter of law “that § 1981 tolerates a certain level of inten-
tional discrimination.”51 Of course, the majority emphatically de-
nied this conclusion.52 In its view, it was merely enforcing what 
it took to be Congress’s policy judgment “that § 1981 as presently 
drawn does not regulate the retail shopping environment to the 
extent urged by the plaintiffs in this case.”53 But § 1981 prohibits 
any racial discrimination that interferes with the making and 
enforcement of contracts, regardless of whether it represents a 
small or large imposition on the practices of departmental retail-
ers.54 The text of § 1981 does not disappear simply because it re-
quires greater policing of corporate retailers than some appellate 
judges would generally prefer.55 And our jury system and sum-
mary judgment standard are designed to ensure that cases 
where core facts are contested are decided by juries, not judges. 
 
 51. Id. at 493 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. at 476 (majority opinion) (denying that its ruling meant “that a cer-
tain level of race discrimination in retail establishments is ‘acceptable’”). 
 53. Id. at 476–77. 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)–(b) (2016) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of 
the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to 
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . includ[ing] 
the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the 
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual 
relationship.”). 
 55. There are other arenas where Judge Murphy has resisted efforts to 
place additional hurdles on top of clear statutory text because adherence to the 
plain language was thought to place too heavy a burden on corporate interests. 
In Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 
1152 (2015), an Eighth Circuit panel considered how a debtor can rescind a 
transaction under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). The statutory text states 
that “the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction . . . by notifying 
the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the [Consumer Financial Protec-
tion] Bureau, of his intention to do so.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2017). The relevant 
regulations likewise state that a consumer may “exercise the right to rescind” 
by “notify[ing] the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram or other means of 
written communication.” Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2) (2018).  
For Judge Murphy, this was a simple case: the “statutory text is clear” and 
so the “sole function of the courts is to enforce the plain language of the statute” 
which requires that debtors only notify creditors of their intention to rescind. 
Keiran, 720 F.3d at 731 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting Coop v. Frederickson, 
545 F.3d 652, 656 (8th Cir. 2008)). But the panel majority disagreed, concluding 
that TILA required not just the notice demanded by the statute, but also a filed 
lawsuit—in part because it worried that a contrary ruling would allow for home-
owners to place an indefinite cloud on the bank’s title to property. Id. at 727–28 
(majority opinion). Judge Murphy’s position was eventually vindicated by a 
unanimous Supreme Court in their “[s]hortest opinion of the year.” See Jesin-
oski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790 (2015); Ronald Mann, 
Opinion Analysis: Shortest Opinion of the Year Explains TILA Rescission Right, 
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Gregory has reverberations. Earlier this year, there was an 
incident at a St. Louis-area Nordstrom that was highly reminis-
cent of the facts in Gregory.56 Three Black teenagers were shop-
ping for prom wear, only to find themselves continually eyed and 
closely shadowed by Nordstrom employees as they moved 
throughout the store.57 They were made so uncomfortable that 
they left, but they returned when they realized one had left a hat 
behind.58 At that point, a White customer called them “a bunch 
of bums.”59 When they asked to speak to a manager about that 
comment and the harassment they had experienced, employees 
refused to allow them to do so.60 
The teenagers then left the store again, but decided to re-
turn because, as they later put it, “[w]e have money, we came 
here to shop and demonstrate to them that we aren’t thugs. We 
have money like anybody else.”61 After they paid for their items, 
they were informed that store employees had called the police, 
claiming the teenagers had shoplifted.62 The teenagers waited 
for the officers to arrive and showed them their bag and receipts, 
at which point the police concluded no crime had occurred.63 
The Nordstrom apologized in this case and the teenagers 
seem uninterested in filing suit—which is fortunate, because un-
der Gregory it would almost certainly be dismissed even if there 
was conclusive evidence that the behavior of the Nordstrom em-
ployees was racially motivated.64 But it is worth noting the 
catch-22 that Gregory placed the teenagers in. Had the teenagers 
left the store after the initial round of shadowing and not re-
turned, Gregory would have foreclosed the contention that they 
 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 13, 2015, 4:22 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/ 
opinion-analysis-shortest-opinion-of-the-year-explains-tila-rescission-right. 
 56. Rachel Siegel, Nordstrom Rack Apologizes After Calling the Police on 
Three Black Teens Who Were Shopping for Prom, WASH. POST (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/05/08/nordstrom 
-rack-called-the-police-on-three-black-teens-who-were-shopping-for-prom. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See supra notes 26–46 and accompanying text. 
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had been blocked or thwarted in their desire to shop at the es-
tablishment65—even though, as it turns out, their instincts re-
garding Nordstrom’s willingness to sell to them as equals turned 
out to be precisely on target.66 On the other hand, once they de-
cided to test the proposition and ring up the sale, they had the 
police called on them67—certainly compounding their humilia-
tion and potentially putting them in physical danger.68 
Put another way, Gregory is really a case about whose in-
stincts one trusts. Black shoppers who experience constant, ob-
trusive shadowing and surveillance feel threatened; they take 
this treatment as evidence that they will not be able to freely 
contract with the store on the same basis as White shoppers. The 
Gregory majority asserts that this sentiment is irrational: no-
body (certainly no juror) could reasonably believe that customers 
are blocked or thwarted from transacting with a department 
store on this basis.69 The Nordstrom teenagers, in effect, called 
that bluff, and the result was a police encounter. What is hap-
pening here is that Black customers are not being respected as 
“knowers”: as the sorts of persons with knowledge and testimony 
that is credible and deserves to be taken seriously.70 Their regu-
lar experience of having to traverse largely White spaces should, 
in the abstract, give them significant insight into what sorts of 
behaviors do and do not signal that they are being viewed as 
threats or accepted as equals. They know what it means when 
store employees begin to shadow them, including what it may 
mean if they do try to carry through with the transaction.71 But 
 
 65. Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 476–77 (8th Cit. 2009) (en 
banc). 
 66. See Siegel, supra note 56. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Note that under Gregory it is unlikely that even Nordstrom’s decision 
to call the police would clear the way for a suit. At least one of the plaintiffs in 
Gregory had police officers waiting for her when she emerged from a dressing 
room, Gregory, 565 F.3d at 492 (Murphy, J., dissenting), and the majority favor-
ably cited a Seventh Circuit decision rejecting a § 1982 claim where shoppers 
were approached by police officers while considering a purchase. Id. at 470–71 
(majority opinion) (citing Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413–15 (7th 
Cir. 1996)). 
 69. See Gregory, 565 F.3d at 476–77. 
 70. See MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS 
OF KNOWING 20 (2007) (explaining the concept of an “epistemic injustice” as “a 
kind of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a 
knower ” ). 
 71. On the experience of being Black in predominantly White spaces, and 
the distinctive knowledge that one accrues from that experience, see Jamelle 
Bouie, White Spaces, SLATE (Apr. 16, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and 
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the Gregory majority did not seem to accept that this knowledge 
was reliable or meaningful compared to their own intuitions 
about what does and does not block a consumer transaction.72 
And therein lies the problem: the summary judgment standard 
does not permit judges to simply substitute their own perspec-
tive for that of a jury. Where reasonable minds could differ as to 
the impact of a store’s practices, then juries make the call.73 But 
the Gregory majority did not accept any room for disagreement: 
it believed that shadowing and surveillance could not reasonably 
obstruct someone from contracting with a department store, and 
any counter-narratives emerging from the lived experience of 
Black shoppers did not even rise to the level of a genuine dispute 
of material fact.74 
Gregory is one example of an endemic problem in antidis-
crimination law. A great many antidiscrimination doctrines de-
mand that legal actors make assessments regarding the serious-
ness or severity of discriminatory practices. These include fine-
grained determinations regarding how pervasive harassment 
 
-politics/2018/04/how-raced-spaces-explain-the-philadelphia-starbucks-arrests 
.html; Jamelle Bouie et al., Being Black in Public, SLATE (Apr. 19, 2018), https:// 
slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/a-conversation-about-starbucks-white 
-fear-and-being-black-in-public.html. 
Discussing the arrest of two Black patrons waiting for a White colleague at 
a Philadelphia-area Starbucks, Tressie McMillan Cottom and Jamelle Bouie 
note how while White persons are always shocked when incidents like this re-
sult in an arrest, for Black observers this sort of escalation is normal and unre-
markable. Bouie et al., supra. The disjuncture between what White people per-
ceive as exceptional and aberrant versus what Black people experience as 
mundane and everyday is demonstrative of how Black testimony simply does 
not penetrate the White imaginary. Id. And this mismatch between White and 
Black perceptions has an ironically self-insulating character: cases where racial 
profiling leads to a police encounter are assumed by White actors to be rare, and 
because they are viewed as rare, those victimized by them are not assumed to 
have any distinctive insight to offer on the normal operation of the practice—
including, say, that for Black individuals in White spaces being threatened with 
or experiencing a call to the police is not rare and is normal. See David Schraub, 
Playing with Cards: Discrimination Claims and the Charge of Bad Faith, 42 
SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 285, 286 (2016) (explaining how epistemic injustice in the 
case of discrimination claims is dangerously self-insulating, because “prejudice 
yields the injustice, and simultaneously wards off complaints aimed at attack-
ing the prejudice”). 
 72. See Gregory, 565 F.3d at 476–77. 
 73. See id. at 478 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Since [plaintiffs] established 
prima facie cases under § 1981 by raising issues of material fact, their claims 
should not have been dismissed on summary judgment.”). 
 74. See id. at 477 (majority opinion) (affirming dismissal on the grounds 
that “§ 1981 as presently drawn does not regulate the retail shopping environ-
ment to the extent urged by the plaintiffs in this case”). 
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is,75 or the degree of power and authority that one employee has 
over another in a given workplace,76 or when new, less desirable 
job requirements are materially adverse to an employee.77 Con-
text is critical in making these determinations—what are the ac-
tual conditions of employment; what are the practical relation-
ships between employer and employee (or worker and customer) 
that are being traded upon?78 Yet, putting aside the fact that 
neither the text of Title VII nor § 1981 provides a safe harbor for 
“de minimis discrimination,”79 it is fair to ask whether relatively 
empowered and insulated judges are reliable arbiters of what 
conduct actually is perceived as—and functionally acts as a form 
of—discrimination. What conduct actually interferes with the 
ability of a racial minority to contract? What conduct actually 
materially alters the terms and conditions of one’s employment? 
Harassment law is particularly notorious in this respect. 
One barrier facing many harassment claims is the doctrine that 
an employer can only be held vicariously liable for harassment if 
the harassment is perpetuated by supervisory employees—a doc-
trine which makes the question “who is a supervisor” of central 
importance.80 In EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., the Eighth 
Circuit considered that question in the context of a discrimina-
tion complaint by novice female interstate truckers who were 
sexually abused by lead drivers during mandatory twenty-eight 
day training trips.81 The court described the training environ-
ment as follows: 
[E]ach trainee embarks on a 28-day, over-the-road training trip with 
an experienced, “Lead Driver,” who familiarizes the trainee with 
CRST’s Team Driving model and evaluates the trainee’s performance 
on this maiden haul. At the conclusion of the trainee’s 28-day training 
 
 75. See infra notes 89–108. 
 76. See infra notes 80–88. 
 77. See Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 716–17 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (concluding that while an adverse employment action need not in-
volve tangible reductions in pay or benefits, it also does not encompass “every-
thing that makes an employee unhappy” (quoting Montandon v. Farmland In-
dus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997))). 
 78. Cf. Richard Delgado, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUT-
TING EDGE, at xv (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (“Normative discourse . . . is 
highly fact sensitive—adding even one new fact can change intuition radi-
cally.”). 
 79. See generally Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 
EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998) (discussing the development of “de minimis” employ-
ment discrimination). 
 80. See Alvarez v. Des Moines Bolt Supply, Inc., 626 F.3d 410, 419 (8th Cir. 
2010). 
 81. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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trip, the trainee’s Lead Driver gives the trainee “a pass/fail driving 
evaluation” that superiors consider when determining whether to cer-
tify the trainee as a full-fledged CRST driver.82 
The instigating charge alleged that lead drivers subjected their 
trainees to sexually-explicit remarks and repeatedly forced fe-
male drivers to have sex with them in exchange for a passing 
grade.83 
The court insulated CRST from liability by concluding that 
the lead drivers were not supervisory employees.84 “Lead Driv-
ers,” the court concluded, “could only (1) dictate minor aspects of 
the trainees’ work experience, such as scheduling rest stops dur-
ing the team drive and (2) issuing a non-binding recommenda-
tion to superiors at the training program’s conclusion concerning 
whether CRST should upgrade the trainee to full-driver sta-
tus.”85 On this point, Judge Murphy vigorously dissented. While 
on the training trip, the trainee and lead driver were effectively 
alone and the lead driver “controlled almost all of a trainee’s day 
to day activities, including when she was permitted to drive, 
when she could stop to use the bathroom, and when she could 
use the truck’s satellite device to communicate with the outside 
world.”86 Context was key, and Judge Murphy sharply criticized 
the majority for 
overlook[ing] the practical reality created by the relationship between 
the trainer and the trainee in living and working together in the con-
fined space of a truck over long routes and by the unusual level of con-
trol the trainers exercised over every aspect of the trainees’ existence 
while on the road. The isolated work environment, trainees’ extended 
time alone with the trainer, the lack of oversight from company man-
agement, the trainers’ near total control over trainees’ daily lives, and 
the trainers’ substantial control over trainees’ promotion chances are 
sufficient to categorize the trainers as supervisors.87 
 In context, it seems patently obvious that the lead drivers 
had—in the Supreme Court’s words—“immediate . . . authority 
over the employee” and consequently qualified as a supervisor.88 
 
 82. Id. at 665. 
 83. Id. at 666. 
 84. Id. at 684. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 697 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 87. Id. at 698. 
 88. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (describing a su-
pervisor as one holding “immediate (or successively higher) authority over the 
employee”). The Supreme Court has since taken a view much closer to that of 
the CRST majority, concluding that to be a supervisor one must be an employee 
“empowered . . . to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to 
effect a ‘significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing 
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Yet here, the blunt object of summary judgment was used to 
override a more fine-grained analysis of the actual relationship 
between trainee and lead drivers—with the result that the case 
was not allowed to go to trial. 
A better use of context in a harassment case can be found in 
2014’s Ellis v. Houston.89 In order for harassment to be actiona-
ble under Title VII, it must be sufficiently “severe and pervasive” 
so as “to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment.”90 
This has been interpreted to pose quite the high bar, and many 
scenarios which a lay reader might perceive as obvious cases of 
harassment have been prevented from reaching trial. In Cottrill 
v. MFA, Inc., for example, repeated acts of peeping on a female 
employee in the bathroom—followed by the demand that the em-
ployee participate in a bait and tape operation to catch the vio-
lator (exposing herself again in the process)—were held to be not 
sufficiently severe forms of harassment to even reach a jury.91 In 
McMiller v. Metro, the court held that being “embraced and 
kissed by a supervisor both before and after vocally objecting to 
such advances, being subjected to an intimate request for per-
sonal body grooming that requires close bodily proximity, and 
being physically prevented from leaving a room by being held in 
place and kissed” could not constitute sexual harassment.92 The 
same conclusion was reached in LeGrand v. Area Resources for 
Community and Human Services, where the allegation was that 
a member of the board of the plaintiff ’s organization asked to 
watch pornographic movies with the plaintiff and asked if they 
could masturbate together, suggested that acceding to those re-
quests would help the plaintiff advance in the company, grabbed 
 
to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a deci-
sion causing a significant change in benefits.’” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 
S. Ct. 2434, 2443, 2453 (2013) (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761) (citing CRST 
favorably). Justice Ginsburg, dissenting on behalf of three other colleagues, con-
tended that this standard “is blind to the realities of the workplace” and indicted 
the majority for “constructing artificial categories where context should be key.” 
Id. at 2457, 2466 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 89. Ellis v. Houston, 742 F.3d 307 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 90. Singletary v. Mo. Dept. of Corr., 423 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)); see Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
 91. Cottrill v. MFA, Inc., 443 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 2006); see id. at 639–40 
(Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 92. McMiller v. Metro, 738 F.3d 185, 191 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
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the plaintiff ’s butt and reached for his genitals, and later 
gripped his thighs.93 
Given precedents such as these, the plaintiffs in Ellis would 
seem to have had a difficult row to hoe. In Ellis, every Black 
prison guard at the maximum security Nebraska State Peniten-
tiary (all five of them) alleged racial harassment (and retalia-
tion) by five of their White supervisors.94 The harassment was 
not physical in nature; rather, it came in the form of “jokes” and 
snide remarks—referring to the Black guards as “the back of the 
bus” or saying “it’s dark in the corner” (where the Black guards 
typically congregated).95 These remarks were sometimes made 
by the supervisors themselves, and sometimes made by other 
guards in the supervisors’ presence (without punishment).96 The 
plaintiffs had the burden of persuading the court that such be-
havior could qualify as severe and pervasive harassment—a bur-
den they did not successfully carry in the district court, which 
dismissed their complaint before a trial.97 
In comparison to some of the fact patterns discussed above,98 
the conduct perpetuated against the Black prison guards might 
seem to be mild sins. But context matters in discrimination 
cases, and Judge Murphy ably marshalled the relevant contex-
tual facts in the record to demonstrate that a reasonable jury 
could find that the Black guards were the victims of unlawful 
harassment.99 In an earlier case, Judge Murphy had written that 
a hostile work environment “is shaped by the accumulation of 
abusive conduct, and the resulting harm cannot be measured by 
carving it into a series of discrete incidents.”100 Here, the “jokes” 
and racially offensive remarks persisted over a period of 
months—a pattern of repetition which reinforced and accentu-
ated their damaging nature.101 Moreover, Judge Murphy empha-
sized the particular work environment of a maximum security 
 
 93. LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Human Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1100 
(8th Cir. 2005). 
 94. Ellis, 742 F.3d at 311. 
 95. Id. at 313. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 311. 
 98. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 99. Ellis, 742 F.3d at 320 (holding that “the context in which abusive re-
marks are made and by whom can increase their severity and the detrimental 
impact”). 
 100. Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 101. Ellis, 742 F.3d at 321–22. 
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prison—where absolute trust in one’s colleagues and assurance 
that they will have your back are nonnegotiable features of a 
functioning work environment.102 One of the Black guards was 
unnerved when none of her colleagues came to her aid when her 
alarm accidentally went off;103 another contended that he “felt 
more threatened by his fellow shift members than by the prison 
inmates.”104 An investigator who looked into the complaints 
trenchantly described the scope of the problem in the context of 
the particular working environment of a maximum security 
prison: 
[T]he safety and the security concerns raised by their comments must 
be addressed. The Nebraska State Penitentiary is a maximum security 
facility in which staff must be able to work with and trust each other. 
[Two of the plaintiffs] have reported that trust no longer exists. This 
adversely affects their safety and security as well as that of other staff, 
inmates, and the public . . . . It also can adversely affect the institu-
tion’s security.105 
Had the Court simply done an abstract, context-free com-
parison of the sort of harassment the Ellis plaintiffs endured to 
other harassment cases which had been dismissed before trial, 
it is unlikely that the case would have proceeded. But context is 
key, and hence (as Judge Murphy had forcefully argued in an 
earlier case) “[t]he facts of any alleged harassment should first 
and lastly be considered on their own merit without comparing 
them line by line to a summation of facts in some other case 
which the court has or has not considered to be triable.”106 The 
context here was that the harassment was occurring in the work 
environment of a maximum security prison where there are 
heightened security demands and absolute trust is non-op-
tional.107 Under these circumstances, Judge Murphy success-
fully convinced a panel to reinstate part of the plaintiffs’ harass-
ment complaint.108 
 
 102. Id. at 317, 324. 
 103. Id. at 313. 
 104. Id. at 317. 
 105. Id. (quoting prison investigator transfer report). 
 106. McMiller v. Metro, 738 F.3d 185, 191 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). 
 107. Ellis, 742 F.3d at 317, 324. Put another way, not being able to trust 
one’s coworkers to watch one’s back may not materially alter the terms and con-
ditions of employment at an accounting firm, but it most certainly alters the 
terms and conditions of employment at a maximum security prison. 
 108. Following remand, the prison guards settled their lawsuit with the 
State for a six-figure sum. Paul Hammel, Nebraska Prison Guards’ Bias Law-
suit Settled for $777,000, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (June 28, 2014), http://www 
.omaha.com/news/crime/nebraska-prison-guards-bias-lawsuit-settled-for/ 
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Consider, as a final example, the use of comparator evidence 
as a means of providing indirect evidence of discrimination.109 Of 
all the ways one might establish discriminatory intent in ab-
sence of a direct prejudiced statement, this might be the most 
intuitive: one points to a “similarly situated” employee who was 
of a different race (or gender, or age, and so on) who was treated 
differently than the plaintiff.110 In the seminal employment dis-
crimination case McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, for exam-
ple, the Court suggested that “evidence that white employees in-
volved in acts against petitioner of comparable seriousness” to 
the acts which were used to justify failing to hire the Black plain-
tiffs “were nevertheless retained or rehired” would be “[e]spe-
cially relevant” to the ultimate finding of discrimination.111 
This, of course, raises the question of how similar is similar 
enough. Given that the ultimate issue of whether there was dis-
criminatory intent is a factual matter reserved for the jury, one 
might suspect that the answer lies on a continuum. At one end 
of the spectrum, where the alleged comparator and the plaintiff 
have little in common, the fact of dissimilar treatment might not 
provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to even possibly 
justify a conclusion of discriminatory intent.112 At the other end, 
where the individuals being compared are virtually identical in 
character—say, where they “dealt with the same supervisor, 
have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the 
same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circum-
stances”113—we might think that dissimilar treatment provides 
close to smoking gun evidence of discriminatory intent (assum-
ing those facts aren’t contested, we could even at that point won-
der if there is a genuinely disputed issue of material fact that the 
defendant did not discriminate). In the middle—where there is 
much in common between the plaintiff and the comparator but 
also some distinguishing circumstances that complicate a 
 
article_0d3d8719-c707-5161-bcf1-c24f55a13fa8.html. 
 109. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 
YALE L.J. 728 (2011) (discussing the challenges with comparators and proposing 
alternate methodologies); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Prov-
ing Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191 (2009) (analyzing com-
parator jurisprudence and proposing ways to create a jury issue). 
 110. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) 
(“McDonnell Douglas teaches that it is the plaintiff ’s task to demonstrate that 
similarly situated employees were not treated equally.”). 
 111. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). 
 112. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 109, at 753–56 (discussing differences between 
comparators). 
 113. Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
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straightforward inference of discrimination—we have what 
seems to be a quintessential jury question. 
This, however, is not the rule in the Eighth Circuit. For 
many years, Eighth Circuit precedent was simply that a compar-
ator had to be similarly situated to the plaintiff in all relevant 
respects.114 But in Clark v. Runyon, the Eighth Circuit took the 
extreme case of comparator evidence articulated above—that in 
which the plaintiff and the comparator “dealt with the same su-
pervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged 
in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing 
circumstances”—and declared it to be the minimum threshold 
showing a plaintiff must produce in order to reach a jury.115 This 
extraordinary evidentiary burden is charmingly described in 
Eighth Circuit precedent as “rigorous.”116 
The case of Ridout v. JBS USA117 provides a good example 
of just how far off the rails this comparator standard had gone—
and Judge Murphy’s efforts to restore the proper role of the jury 
in discrimination cases. In Ridout, a long-time employee (Ridout) 
was terminated from his supervisory position at a pork pro-
cessing plant, allegedly for swearing and raising his voice during 
an argument on a loud factory floor.118 He sued alleging age dis-
crimination.119 Among the evidence he mustered for his case was 
the fact that his replacement was a younger man who had been 
previously terminated for racist behavior (he had crafted a mock 
Ku Klux Klan hood and displayed it to an African-American 
coworker)—seemingly a considerably more serious infraction 
than yelling in the workplace.120 The forgiveness shown to that 
employee, in contrast to his own summary termination, was in 
Ridout’s view probative evidence that the true motivation for his 
dismissal was age.121 
 
 114. This language first appears in passing in Meyers v. Ford Motor Co., 659 
F.2d 91, 93 (8th Cir. 1981). By 1985 it had been elevated to a holding. Smith v. 
Monsanto Chem. Co., 770 F.2d 719, 723 (8th Cir. 1985); see Lanear v. Safeway 
Grocery, 843 F.2d 298, 301 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[The] claim of disparate treatment 
must rest on proof that [the comparators] were ‘similarly situated in all relevant 
respects.’” (citing Smith, 770 F.2d at 723)). 
 115. Clark, 218 F.3d at 918. 
 116. EEOC v. Kohler Co., 335 F.3d 766, 775 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Harvey 
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
 117. Ridout v. JBS USA, 716 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 118. Id. at 1084. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1086. 
 121. Id. 
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Under Clark, however, Ridout had a problem: racist mis-
deeds are not the same conduct as raising one’s voice in a loud 
factory setting.122 To get around this issue, Judge Murphy’s opin-
ion placed three important constraints on the “rigorous” compar-
ator standard that was then prevailing. First, drawing from the 
Seventh Circuit, she observed that the “similarly situated co-
worker inquiry is a search for a substantially similar employee, 
not for a clone.”123 Second, she emphasized that a valid compar-
ator did not need to have engaged in the exact same offense as 
the plaintiff—particularly where the comparator had engaged in 
relatively more serious misconduct.124 Third, she cabined the 
“rigorous” comparator requirements by suggesting that they 
stood for “the unremarkable proposition that the ideal compara-
tor will match the characteristics of the plaintiff employee in as 
many respects as possible” and that “the probative value of com-
parator evidence will be greatest when the circumstances faced 
by the putative comparators are most similar to the plain-
tiff ’s.”125  
In many ways, the comparator evidence standard is the 
most egregious example of courts using doctrinal workarounds 
to subvert the purpose of summary judgment. Declaring that 
only comparators who are functional clones of the plaintiff suf-
fice to create a triable issue of fact is nothing but a case of courts 
taking it upon themselves to independently weigh the evidence. 
Ridout thus served as an important brake on a trend in discrim-
ination jurisprudence where genuine issues of disputed fact were 
being removed from consideration by juries. Clearly, the ideal 
comparator is one who meets the “rigorous” standard articulated 
in Clark—one who is, more or less, a clone of the plaintiff. And 
equally clearly, at some point the proffered comparator is so dis-
 
 122. Id. at 1084–85. Indeed, part of Ridout’s dilemma was that nobody at the 
company could ever remember any case where another employee was termi-
nated for yelling on a loud factory floor—presumably because yelling on loud 
factory floors is in fact quite common and usually unobjectionable behavior. See 
id. at 1084; see also Goldberg, supra note 109, at 753 (discussing the problem 
where there are “no sufficiently comparable coworkers”). 
 123. Ridout, 716 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 
612 F.3d 908, 916 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
 124. Id. (citing Lynn v. Deaconess Med. Ctr.-W. Campus, 160 F.3d 484, 487 
(8th Cir. 1998)). 
 125. Id. Lest these all seem like obvious points, note that the district court 
had granted summary judgment to the employer in part because it refused to 
concede the legitimacy of Ridout’s comparator evidence. Ridout v. JBS USA, 886 
F. Supp. 2d 1127 (S.D. Iowa 2012). 
  
86 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:65 
 
similar from the plaintiff that it does not suffice to create a gen-
uine issue of material fact around the question of discriminatory 
intent. But it should not be controversial that there exists space 
between these two poles where the evidence is ambiguous and 
could be interpreted in a variety of different lights. When circuit 
precedent removes such cases from the hands of the jury and 
disposes of them at summary judgment, it indicates that there 
is in fact a “special” summary judgment standard in discrimina-
tion cases—one in which employers are unduly favored over em-
ployees. 
III. 
There is a whole network of precedents which seek to 
preemptively strip discrimination cases away from juries and 
dispose of them at summary judgment.126 Judge Murphy had 
generally resisted this practice, with varying degrees of success. 
But what accounts for this trend in the first place? One potential 
answer is the sense among many members of the legal commu-
nity that discrimination cases tend to be weaker than other filed 
claims.127 Is that sense accurate? We know that discrimination 
cases are notoriously difficult to win—indeed, they have among 
the lowest rates of success of any type of case filed in federal 
court.128 In itself, that does not necessarily demonstrate the 
claims are weaker without resorting to tautology—discrimina-
tion claims are disproportionate losers because they tend to be 
bad claims, and we know they are bad claims because they lose 
disproportionately. 
Nonetheless, one can construct some plausible pathways for 
why plaintiffs might file antidiscrimination cases even in cir-
cumstances where evidence supporting the claim is weak. For 
example, it may be that employees who have endured generic 
bad behavior by their employer—an unjust termination or an ar-
bitrary demotion—do not realize that such conduct is not unlaw-
ful unless it can be attributed to a covered form of discrimina-
tion.129 In this way, a case that is really an (intuitively strong, 
 
 126. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 49, at 21. 
 127. Cf. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard 
to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 571 (2001) (“Nevertheless, it does seem, for what-
ever reason, that there are a fair number . . . of employment discrimination 
cases that should never have been filed . . . .”). 
 128. Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the 
Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1282–85 (2012). 
 129. See generally Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the 
Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447 (suggesting, 
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but legally null) assertion of generic unjust treatment might get 
converted into a (intuitively weak, but legally cognizable) claim 
of discrimination. If such circumstances are common, they could 
easily yield a glut of filed discrimination cases with systemati-
cally weaker facts than other sorts of federal claims. 
This instinct is buttressed by the fact that—while discrimi-
nation claims are overwhelmingly dismissed before ever reach-
ing a trial—even those that make it to a jury lose far more often 
than they win.130 Assuming that only the strongest claims sur-
vive the gauntlet of hostile precedents sketched above, the fact 
that most of them still end up losing before a jury is strongly 
suggestive that most of the cases dismissed before trial would 
have ended up losing in front of a jury as well. 
Defenders of the above precedents might therefore suggest 
that they are simply engaged in efficient dispute resolution: all 
these precedents do, in practice, is act to weed out cases that 
would have lost at the trial stage anyway.131 One potential prob-
lem with this line of reasoning is that it assumes that judicial 
assessments of what makes a strong or weak case track attitudes 
in the broader population—an assumption which may be ques-
tionable.132 But there’s a more fundamental concern: the court’s 
role on summary judgment is not to predict, even accurately, the 
 
from survey evidence, that workers overestimate their legal rights to challenge 
unjust employer conduct, and that the existence of at-will employment rules 
does not alter their perceptions). 
 130. Eyer, supra note 128, at 1283–84 (finding that eighty-six percent of dis-
crimination claims litigated to conclusion lose either at the motion to dismiss or 
summary judgment stage, and that, of the remainder that reach a jury, defend-
ants are two-and-a-half times as likely to prevail as plaintiffs). 
 131. See Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (describing summary judgment as “a useful pretrial tool to determine 
whether any case, including one alleging discrimination, merits a trial”). 
 132. The keynote study here is Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald 
Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the Perils 
of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009), analyzing the Supreme 
Court case of Scott v. Harris. In Scott, the Supreme Court used video evidence 
to conclude that no reasonable jury could have determined that the respondent 
(Harris) was not driving “in such fashion as to endanger human life,” such that 
a chasing police officer (Scott) would not be reasonable in ramming Harris’s ve-
hicle. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman 
showed the video to a large sample of Americans and found that, while a major-
ity agreed with the Court’s assessment, a significant (and nonrandomly distrib-
uted) subset disagreed. Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra, at 879. This sug-
gests that, while it was likely that Scott would have ultimately prevailed, the 
Court was incorrect to conclude that no reasonable jury would have found in 
Harris’s favor. Id. at 881. 
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ultimate conclusion of a jury. The operative question at sum-
mary judgment is not whether the jury will rule for the nonmov-
ing party, but rather whether a reasonable jury could, given the 
existence of contested facts and the multiple reasonable poten-
tial inferences one could draw from them.133 If judicial doctrines 
stripping cases away from juries are justified on efficiency 
grounds, that would also represent a “special” summary judg-
ment rule applicable only in the discrimination case context. 
Put another way, there is a built-in asymmetry in assessing 
the validity of summary judgment rulings. If a court consistently 
denied summary judgment in cases where the nonmoving party 
subsequently lost at trial, that would not in itself call into ques-
tion the propriety of the pre-trial ruling. Our jury system fully 
accounts for the fact that many filed cases which make it to trial 
may nonetheless lose. But if a court consistently grants sum-
mary judgment in cases where the party resisting the motion 
would have prevailed at trial, that would raise significant red 
flags. It would suggest that the court’s sense of what a reasona-
ble jury could or could not do were significantly out of sync with 
actual jury appraisals—with the result that judges were func-
tionally substituting the jury’s assessment of the evidence with 
their own.134 
The larger problem is this: antidiscrimination doctrine in 
the Eighth Circuit (and, to be fair, often outside of the Eighth 
Circuit) allows judges to peremptorily declare that actions which 
 
 133. See, e.g., Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. 
 134. To be clear, it is not the case that any time a jury would find in favor of 
a party that resisted summary judgment, then summary judgment for the other 
party would by definition have been unjustified. Putting aside the potential 
problem of unreasonable juries, in some circumstances it might be the case that 
the jury simply misunderstood the legal rules it was trying to apply. For exam-
ple, if a jury in an age discrimination suit found for the plaintiff, but only be-
cause it viewed the plaintiff ’s termination as unfair (without concluding that 
age had anything to do with it), that verdict would clearly be improper. 
But note how that is different from a jury concluding that the termination 
was based on age in circumstances where a judge did not think the evidence of 
age discrimination was sufficiently strong to send the case to the jury (perhaps 
due to the comparator evidence rules described above, see supra notes 109–26 
and accompanying text). Again, there might well be cases where juries are mak-
ing strained inferences from extraordinarily thin evidence, such that we might 
deem the verdict to simply be unreasonable. But if there was a consistent mis-
match between a jury conclusion that discrimination did occur and a judicial 
determination that a reasonable jury could only conclude that discrimination 
didn’t occur, that would suggest a serious deficiency in the summary judgment 
determination that would not be paralleled in cases where courts declined to 
grant summary judgment and juries nonetheless ruled in favor of the defend-
ant. 
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many consumers would likely consider significant obstructions 
of their attempts to contract are no barrier at all;135 that behav-
iors many employees would deem shocking cases of harassment 
are not severe enough to matter;136 that coworkers who control 
the functional working life of trainees under their charge are not 
supervisors;137 and that significant comparator evidence of dis-
criminatory intent is insufficient to persuade any reasonable ju-
ror.138 This is not how summary judgment is supposed to work, 
and in other areas of law it is not how summary judgment does 
work. The straightforward rule of summary judgment is that 
where a reasonable jury could draw inferences supporting the 
claim of the nonmoving party, the case goes to trial.139 To the 
extent antidiscrimination precedents do not adhere to that rule, 
then there has once again come to be a special discrimination 
case exception to the summary judgment standard. 
Which brings us back to Torgerson. As noted at the outset, 
the major legal shift in Torgerson was to officially renounce a 
series of precedents which had suggested that summary judg-
ment should be sparingly granted in discrimination cases.140 At 
the outset of his dissent, Judge Smith (joined by Judges Murphy, 
Bye, Melloy, and Shepherd) agreed that the “cautionary lan-
guage for handling discrimination cases . . . probably should not 
have survived the mid-eighties as there is no ‘discrimination 
case exception’ to the summary judgment standard.”141 But, he 
continued “we should never forget that, ‘[a]t the summary judg-
ment stage, the court should not weigh the evidence, make credi-
bility determinations, or attempt to determine the truth of the 
matter . . . . If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of 
the evidence, summary judgment is inappropriate.’”142 
 In this context, it is worth revisiting the precise language of 
the cases that supposedly created a special discrimination case 
standard for summary judgment. “Summary judgment should 
seldom be granted in employment discrimination cases because 
 
 135. See supra notes 26–46 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 89–97 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 80–88 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra notes 114–26 and accompanying text. 
 139. See generally Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (discussing the sum-
mary judgment standard). 
 140. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
 141. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1054 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 142. Id. (quoting Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376–77 (8th Cir. 
1996)). 
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intent is often the central issue and claims are often based on 
inference.”143 “Summary judgment seldom should be granted in 
discrimination cases where inferences are often the basis of the 
claim . . . .”144 One way of reading this language is prescriptive: 
demanding a different, looser summary judgment standard in 
the discrimination case context to account for the fact that 
“claims are often based on inference.”145 If that is what these 
precedents mean, then indeed they cannot survive the Supreme 
Court’s clear instruction that the summary judgment rule is a 
universal one.146 
But another way of reading these cases is descriptive: ob-
serving that features of the typical discrimination case will often 
make them poor candidates for summary judgment under the 
universal standard because compared to other sorts of cases, dis-
crimination “claims are often based on inference[s]” that are ul-
timately for a jury to decide upon.147 Under the latter reading, 
courts “should” be less likely to grant summary judgment in dis-
crimination cases—not because they are concocting a special dis-
crimination case summary judgment rule, but because they are 
applying the regular one. And by the same token, if courts are 
too willing to adopt their own inferential judgment regarding 
what does and does not qualify as discrimination across diverse 
and deeply contested fact patterns, that would suggest that—
contrary to Torgerson’s mandate—there is a discrimination case 
exception to summary judgment: one favoring employers over 
employees and perpetrators over victims. 
When the Supreme Court first instructed lower courts that 
they should not “treat discrimination differently from other ulti-
mate questions of fact,” it was in the context of admonishing a 
court which was too quick to dismiss a discrimination claim by 
merging questions of fact and law together.148 Yet Torgerson has 
come to stand for the proposition that courts have been too solic-
itous of discrimination claimants and should stretch to ensure 
that as few of their claims reach juries as possible. The irony of 
Torgerson is that almost as soon as it was decided it already had 
fallen into twilight: yielding a new discrimination case standard 
 
 143. Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations 
omitted). 
 144. Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See cases cited supra note 19. 
 147. See, e.g., Peterson, 406 F.3d at 520. 
 148. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). 
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for summary judgment, just as exceptional as the old one, but 
merely flipping which party is favored. Whereas Judge Murphy’s 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence was marked by an uncompro-
mising insistence that facts and context matter and that nothing 
about discrimination claims makes judges more apt at substitut-
ing their judgment for those of a jury of peers, Torgerson’s legacy 
has been the opposite. In the course of defending a single, uni-
versal standard of summary judgment, Torgerson has embold-
ened judges to plow over context and wash away reasonable dis-
putes over relevant facts. The results have been incompatible 
with the true role of summary judgment and hostile to the un-
derlying purposes of antidiscrimination law. And until the court 
which authored Torgerson is willing to actually abide by its dic-
tates—actually ensuring that there is no discrimination case ex-
ception to the application of summary judgment—it seems more 
than fair that Judge Murphy’s rule be followed, lest the case con-
tinue to be cited for a proposition so repeatedly breached. 
